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Abstract
In this paper, we propose to design a market game that
(a) can be used in modeling and studying commodity trad-
ing scenarios, and (b) can be used in capturing human
traders’ behaviors. Specifically, we demonstrate the useful-
ness of this commodity trading game in a single-commodity
futures trading scenario. A pilot experiment was run with
a mixture of human traders and an autonomous agent that
emulates the aggregated market condition, with the assump-
tion that this autonomous agent would hint each of its action
through a public announcement. We show that the informa-
tion collected from this simulation can be used to extract the
pattern of successful human traders. Finally, we elaborate
on the potential of this market game in studying autonomous
commodity trading.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the study of trading in electronic markets
has received significant amount of attention, particularly in
the areas of artificial intelligence and electronic commerce.
With increasingly sophisticated technologies being applied
in analyzing information and making decisions, fully au-
tonomous software agents are expected to take up signifi-
cant roles in many important fields. This trend is most ob-
vious in the financial domain, where speed of reaction is
highly valued and significant investments have been made
in information and communication technologies.
Despite the successes of automated trading in many im-
portant classes of financial markets [5], commodity trading
has lagged behind, mainly because of its complicated prod-
uct categorization and logistical fulfillment considerations.
To help human commodity traders in making better deci-
sions and to enable automated commodity trading, we need
better software tools.
In this paper, we propose to design a market game that is
suitable for running commodity trading simulations. The
goal of the designed market game is to serve as a tool
for training human traders and studying successful trad-
ing strategies, so as to lay the foundation for designing au-
tonomous trading agents. With a classroom experiment, we
demonstrate that the proposed system is indeed capable of
achieving these two goals.
2. Background
2.1. Basics of the Commodity Trading Simulation
In this paper, commodity trading refers to the trading of
raw or primary products that can be specified by standard
contracts. Examples of such commodities include crops,
oil, and live cattle. Similar to other financial market, a wide
variety of derivatives are available for hedging or specu-
lative purposes. Despite all the similarities, there are two
distinguishing features of commodity market when com-
pared to other financial markets like stock or bond. The
first feature is the need to consider physical fulfillment. For
example, when engaged in a commodity contract, besides
just price consideration, the point of delivery, method of
delivery, and date of delivery must all be carefully consid-
ered. The second feature is the seasonalities embedded in
demands and supplies of many important commodities (not
all). For example, the consumption of oil and the supply
of agriculture products are highly seasonal, and are closely
related to the weather conditions. These considerations are
what make commodity trading different and challenging.
Although agent-based simulations for commodity trad-
ing (or markets that are similar to commodity markets) are
not new, most related past literatures focus either on mar-
ket design [7], agent-based simulations [8], or behavioral
study [3]. To address our specific needs, we have to design
our own simulation for studying commodity trading, with
the considerations of the following criteria:
• Realism. The simulation should present the most chal-
lenging characteristics in a real-world commodity trad-
ing environment, namely physical fulfillment and sea-
sonalities that are linked to various external factors.
• Flexibility. The simulation should be flexible enough
to simulate the trading of a wide variety of commodi-
ties. These flexibilities include the ability to imple-
ment a wide range of market mechanisms, fulfillment
requirements, and a rich set of external events.
• Usability. The organization of the user interface should
be intuitive and matches real-world trading.
2.2. Market Games
A market game defines a collection of agents interact-
ing with each other through market mechanisms. Analytical
game-theoretic analysis usually only works on simple auc-
tion mechanisms and researchers are increasingly interested
in applying empirical approaches and agent-based simula-
tions to the study of complex mechanisms [2, 4]. When
studying real-world scenarios with market games, we need
a general platform that can be configured to execute various
types of market mechanisms, define a wide variety of tasks,
and specify agent’s strategies. In recent years, we have seen
the emergence of the development of such platforms (e.g.,
see references in [6]). This makes empirical study of com-
plicated market games much easier.
Despite the progress being made in the development of
market game platforms, studying real-world scenarios re-
mains challenging. In most real-world scenarios, one major
challenge is to identify a collection of realistic and repre-
sentative agent strategies that can be used in simulations.
Develop even just one such strategy would be non-trivial,
and in order to run a meaningful simulation, we need lots of
them. To address this issue, researchers have turned chal-
lenging scenarios into competitions [1,9], and through com-
petitions, researchers can independently work to develop
various agent strategies that can be used both in the com-
petitions and later on in the simulation studies.
The success in studying complex scenarios via compe-
titions is what motivates our research. However, the ma-
jor difference of our system when compared to the past re-
search is the deliberate involvement of human agents (com-
pared to all autonomous agents in the previous research).
We design the system this way so that we can capture
the best practices from human agents. In an environment
where it is difficult to design an agent strategy from scratch,
the proposed system can help to extract important princi-
ples that can later be used in developing fully autonomous
agents.
3. Designing and Implementing the Commod-
ity Trading Simulation
In Section 2.1, we elaborate on what constitutes a good
design for a commodity trading simulation. In this section,
we propose the actual design of the simulation.
From the previous definition, we can see that a typical
commodity trading simulation constitutes a group of agents
(can be autonomous or human) and a set of market mech-
anisms for agents to trade in. This is exactly the definition
of a market game, and thus we can take advantage of exist-
ing research and development in this area. In particular, we
choose to build our simulation on a generic market gaming
system called AB3D [6].
AB3D is a flexible auction server and market game plat-
form. With AB3D, we can describe and implement a com-
modity trading scenario as a market game. The scripting
languages for both auction specification and market game
definition allow us to easily change the commodity trading
scenario without involved coding, thus we can focus on the
study of the commodity trading.
For the simulation that is reported in this paper, we
choose to work on a simplified scenario so as to allow a
smoother learning curve for human traders. In the current
simulation, we focus mainly on the impacts of external fac-
tors on commodity’s supply and demand, and neglect the
physical fulfillment feature. We assume that players are
trading in a commodity futures market, can assume either
long or short positions at any time, and always close out
their positions before the game ends (if an agent fails to
close out its position, the game manager should penalize
this agent and use the futures price at the end of game to
close out its position). As in most real-world markets, we
assume that the market mechanism used in the exchange is
a continuous double auction (CDA). Also, we assume that
the market can always provide contracts necessary for the
player to establish long or short positions.
In the following sections, we describe in detail on how
to create a commodity trading simulation on the AB3D plat-
form.
3.1. The Setup for the Commodity Trading Game
The commodity trading game designed in this paper, as
described previously, focuses on emulating the impact of
external events in making trading-related decisions. More
specifically, we assume that supply and demand for the fu-
tures contracts are driven by both human traders’ behav-
iors and aggregated market force represented by a software
agent. The high-level interactions of agents and the market
mechanism are illustrated in Figure 1.
There are three important components in Figure 1: the
player agent that serves as the proxy for a human trader,
the market agent that represents aggregated market force,
and the market mechanism that brokers transactions. Each
player agent is loaded with necessary user interface and un-
derlaying infrastructure for retrieving real-time market in-
formation and sending trading requests. For the market
agent, a pre-defined market scenario on the supply and de-
mand is specified by the game designer in conjunction with
associated news events that serve as hints on where the mar-
ket is moving. The market game server is the central loca-
tion that stores all the market-related information and exe-
cutes the trades.
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Figure 1. The setup of the trading game.
The AB3D platform provides the necessary software
framework for designing trading scenarios, realizing auc-
tion designs, and providing low-level agent communica-
tions; thus we can focus on building the agents and the sce-
nario. The design of the player agent for human traders
and the market agent are described in Section 3.2 and Sec-
tion 3.3 respectively.
3.2. The Design of the Player Agent
When designing the proxy agent for human traders, we
focus our design on the presentation of market information,
including current account snapshot, completed transactions,
current standing bid, historical price evolution, and list of
external events.
To simplify each player’s decision making process, we
assume that he/she can have at most one standing bid con-
taining exactly one price-quantity point, and whenever a
new bid is issued by the player, it will replace the current
standing bid. Therefore, the parameters that a player has
to determine for each bid is just: price, quantity, and the
direction (long or short).
To capture every player’s trading behaviors, important
actions are recorded. In particular, whenever a player reads
the detail of a news event or executes a trade, that action is
attached with a timestamp and stored on the game server.
3.3. The Design of the Market Agent
In our design, human traders are trading among them-
selves and also with the aggregated market represented by a
market agent. One important task of this market agent is to
provide necessary liquidity representing underlaying supply
and demand structure of the particular commodity. To em-
ulate real-world market conditions, market agent will main-
tain a bid containing multiple price-quantity points, where
each bid point represents the amount of long or short con-
tract that is provided at the specific price tick. The content
of this bid is regularly updated by the market agent in order
to reflect the ongoing market condition.
The planned impact on price
News announced Price impact introduced
Latency of impact
Title: US holiday spending shows moderate growth.
Time
Figure 2. The definition of a typical external
event (in the form of a news).
As discussed earlier, one important feature we would like
to have in the simulation is time-varying market condition
that can be inferred from external events. An external event
is specified by the following important characteristics: (1)
the title and the content that provide the context, (2) the time
when the event is announced, (3) the time when the impact
is introduced, and (4) the magnitude of the impact on supply
or demand, represented as a function. The definition of a
typical external event is illustrated in Figure 2.
4. Experiment and Analysis
To test the effectiveness of a market game in commod-
ity trading simulation, we worked with an experienced oil
trader and collaboratively generated a scenario that reason-
ably captured ongoing crude oil market (more precisely, the
traded commodity is Western Texas Intermediate (WTI)).
For the pilot experiment, the participants were drawn from
students in a commodity trading class focused on crude oil
trading. Prior to the simulation, these students had already
been trained rigorously on the fundamentals of crude oil
trading and this simulation was used as an arena for them
to practice the knowledge and techniques they had learned
in the class. In this section, we describe the scenario in de-
tail and present the result and analysis on the experiment.
4.1. Experiment Setup
The crude oil trading scenario is designed to let traders
trade WTI with the following setup:
• The Players. We assume that each player is only au-
thorized to establish positions (either long or short) up
to 2,000k barrels (bbls). Once a player has reached his
authority limit of 2,000k bbls he/she will not be able to
take further positions in the same direction.
• The Market. At the beginning of the game, the bid
and the ask prices in the market are set to $59.90/bbl
and $60.10/bbl respectively1. Initially, there are 200k
bbls available for sell or buy at all price ticks, which
is separated by 10 cents in order to exaggerate prof-
its and losses. Subsequent announcement of the news
events will alter available volumes at some prices, as
indicated in Section 3.3.
The background of the oil trading scenario is set to be at
the beginning of the first quarter of 2007, when the crude
oil price is weak and a mix of bullish and bearish news
are striking the market at the same time. The fuzzy situ-
ation involving Iran’s nuclear ambition further complicates
the reading on the market. This information was briefed to
all participants before the game starts, and after a brief in-
troduction and practice session, the simulation was run for
about 70 minutes.
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Figure 3. The price fluctuation created by mar-
ket agent, when no other trading occurs.
The planned price movement can be seen in Figure 3.
Notice that the movement plotted in Figure 3 is gener-
ated without any transaction from human traders. Thus it
could be viewed as the underlaying trend of the market
that is hidden from all human players. The movement of
the price is periodically hinted though the announcement of
news events (to be more precise, one news event is released
roughly every two minutes). The gap between a news event
and its corresponding price movement (the “latency on im-
pact” in Figure 2) is around 30 seconds.
4.2. Result and Analysis
Eleven human players participated in the simulation,
where the best agent earned $3,480k and the worse agent
1By definition, the bid price is the highest standing buy bid, and the ask
price is the lowest standing sell bid.
lost $62,449k. Investigating what caused this difference is
one of primary goals for designing the platform. In this sec-
tion, we will answer this question.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, many of human players’
important actions are captured by the proxy agent, thus
we could base our analysis on these observations. In the
post-game-analysis, we have identified three most impor-
tant time series which we believe are the primary factors
that determine trader’s performances. These three time se-
ries are: 1) trader’s position balance, b) realized market
price movement, and c) planned market price movement (as
plotted in Figure 3).
By plotting these three time series for the best and the
worst agents, it becomes quite obvious why their perfor-
mances differ so much. Figures 4 and 5 plot the best and
the worst agent respectively. In both figures, the planned
and the realized market price movements are plotted as thin
solid line and thin dotted line respectively, with labels on
the left y-axis. On the other hand, agent’s position balance
is plotted as the thicker line, with labels on the right y-axis.
In the following sub-sections, we illustrate and analyze
the trading patterns of the best and the worst agents, and
discuss their implications.
4.2.1. Analyzing Winning Agents
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Figure 4. The agent with best performance.
Figure 4 illustrates the trading pattern of the best agent.
From the chart and also from the post-game interview, it is
obvious that his strategy was based on continuously updated
long-term prediction on the market movement (as a result,
its position balance is almost an inverse of the planned mar-
ket price movement). An interesting observation is that this
pattern can also be observed in other profit-earning traders,
although their strategy executions are not as perfect as the
one shown here. This common pattern suggests that for this
simple trading scenario, a winning strategy pattern could
indeed be captured by running a controlled trading experi-
ment.
We would like to point out that since this strategy is
based on the first-order price movement, if all agents adopt
this strategy, any price movement will be exploited almost
immediately, and thus this strategy alone will not be suffi-
cient in emulating the dynamics of real trading2. To better
understand and predict what traders would do in a com-
petitive environment, we would have to employ a game-
theoretic analysis involving more than one strategy, which
is beyond the concern of this paper. However, the general
procedure discussed in this section can still serve as an use-
ful guideline in discovering additional strategies.
4.2.2. Analyzing Losing Agents
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Figure 5. The agent with worst performance.
As shown in Figure 5, the worst agent followed “realized
market price” instead of trading against “planned market
price”, which is hinted via news events. This implies that
when making trading decisions, it ignored what was hinted
in the news events and just followed the market. This is a
mistake that is quite common among novice traders, and as
expected, it ended up “bought high and sold low”. Unlike
the case of winning agents, where all of them share a com-
mon pattern, the trading patterns of the losing agents vary a
lot.
4.3. Implications
From our analysis and also post-game interviews, we can
get a pretty clear picture as to what constitutes a successful
trading strategy. Note that the strategy identified is not what
we claimed to be the major contribution. The major contri-
bution of this experiment is to show that the market game
designed for this commodity trading scenario is indeed an
effective tool for identifying human trader’s strategies.
2Note that almost half of the market liquidity is provided by a pre-
programmed, non-adaptive software agent, that is why this strategy could
still be profitable in our experiment.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Although this scenario appears to be trivial, beating the
market and earning a profit is a non-trivial task. Trading
successfully in this market involves accurate reading of the
market condition, careful strategy execution, and adaptive-
ness to unexpected changes in market dynamics. As ana-
lyzed in the previous sections, a controlled experiment can
indeed help us to isolate important factors involved in trad-
ing and identify the pattern for a winning strategy.
In our future work, we are interested in extending the
current scenario so as to include physical fulfillment con-
siderations. Such market game simulation would be quite
unique and we view it as an useful tool in studying various
issues involved in the commodity trading business.
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